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I. INTRODUCTION
Jerome Holloway is a mentally retarded man in Georgia accused of robbery and
murder.1 With an I.Q. of forty-nine, Holloway’s mental age is that of a seven year
old.2 Holloway cannot tell time, does not know what country he lives in, and cannot
recite the alphabet.3 Holloway’s attorney described him as a man who is “poor and
illiterate and totally without the mental facilities to understand the fate which
awaited him.”4 Nonetheless, Holloway confessed to the crimes, although he could
not even read his statement.5 Holloway was sentenced to death.6 On appeal,
1
Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental
Retardation, 13 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1(G) (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2001/ustat.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Joe Parham, Condemned Man Called ‘Most Retarded Man on Death Row,’ UNITED
PRESS INT’L, Oct. 12, 1987, Monday, PM Cycle, Domestic News.
5

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

6

Id.
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Holloway’s lawyers demonstrated Holloway’s lack of comprehension by asking
whether he assassinated Presidents Lincoln, Kennedy, and Reagan.7 Holloway
replied that he assassinated all three.8 Holloway was described as “the most retarded
man on death row anywhere in the nation.”9 Just hours before his scheduled
execution, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned Holloway’s sentence due to his
lack of mental capacity.10
Earl Washington is a mentally retarded man from Virginia with an I.Q. between
fifty-seven and sixty-nine.11 Washington, who has a mental age of ten, “knows
‘some,’ but not all, of the letters of the alphabet.”12 In 1983, Washington was
arrested for a minor assault.13 During his interrogation, Washington confessed to
various other crimes, including a 1982 rape and murder.14 Despite concluding that
most of Washington’s confessions were false, the State prosecuted Washington and
sentenced him to death.15 Great weight was given to Washington’s confessions.16
Washington was later exonerated by DNA tests and pardoned in 2000.17
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia held
unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded individuals.18 The Court did not,
however, set forth a definition of mental retardation or a procedural standard by
which mental retardation would be decided.19 The result is a plethora of procedures
and definitions that differ from state to state.20 Ohio and Georgia are two states with
vastly different procedures for determining mental retardation. These different
procedures may lead to an arbitrary application of Atkins, which “arguably violates”
Furman v. Georgia.21
7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Parham, supra note 4.

10

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id; see also Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1984).

15

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

19

Id. at 317. The Court’s decision to leave to the states the task of developing a
procedural standard has recently been reaffirmed. See Schriro v. Smith, No. 04-1475, 2005
U.S. LEXIS 7652 (Oct. 17, 2005).
20

See, e.g., State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio 2002) (setting forth procedural
framework in Ohio for determining mental retardation); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2005)
(setting forth procedural framework in Georgia for determining mental retardation).
21

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (“Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be
imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted
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First, Ohio and Georgia have adopted different burdens of proof for establishing
mental retardation.22 Like Ohio, the majority of states require that mental retardation
be established by a preponderance of the evidence.23 By contrast, Georgia is the only
state that requires defendants to prove mental retardation beyond a reasonable
doubt.24 Georgia’s higher standard of proof causes several problems. For example,
Georgia’s burden of proving mental retardation is inconsistent with its burden of
proving affirmative defenses.25 Also, the mentally retarded defendant’s reduced
mental capacity justifies a lower standard of proof.26 Further, an individual alleging
mental retardation may have better success prevailing in Ohio on his or her claim
than in Georgia.27 Such a result is unacceptable because it may result in an arbitrary
application of Atkins.
Second, while Ohio requires the judge to make the mental retardation
determination,28 Georgia requires the jury to decide the issue.29 If a jury is biased
toward a mentally retarded defendant it does not understand, then allowing that jury
to make the retardation determination is inappropriate.30 It is more appropriate to
require the judge, who has more experience making impartial decisions, to determine
mental retardation.31 Ohio and Georgia have each adopted a definition of mental
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”); see also Cynthia Orpen, Following in the Footsteps
of Ford: Mental Retardation and Capital Punishment Post-Aktins, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 88
(2003) (arguing that the failure of the Supreme Court to set a uniform state standard for
determining insanity and mental retardation leads to an arbitrary application of capital
sentences, which “arguably violates Furman”).
22

Compare Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015 (requiring capital defendants prove mental
retardation by a “preponderance of the evidence”), with GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3)
(2005) (requiring capital defendants prove mental retardation “beyond a reasonable doubt”).
23

Orpen, supra note 21, at 96.

24

Id. at 96-97.

25

See Amanda Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 171, 198 (2002) (arguing the role of mental retardation will “change from
being a mitigating factor to being akin to an affirmative defense”).
26

Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment: State
Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
59, 135 (1996).
27

See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95 (arguing the lack of definite procedural standard for use
in determining mental retardation for Atkins purposes leads to an “arbitrary and inconsistent
application of Atkins”).
28

State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002)

29

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2005).

30

See, e.g., Bing, supra note 26, at 86 (“Juries may actually interpret mental retardation as
an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor in the decision of whether to impose capital
punishment.”); Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court Deals a Fatal
Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 699, 723 (1990) (arguing
that a jury may see mental retardation as something that may make the defendant more
dangerous).
31
As discussed below, judges are trained to be impartial. See infra notes 200-05 and
accompanying text.
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retardation similar to those adopted by the American Psychiatric Association and the
American Association on Mental Retardation.32 These definitions can help serve as a
guide for a national legal definition of mental retardation.
This Note compares Ohio’s and Georgia’s post-Atkins frameworks for
determining mental retardation. Ohio’s framework offers a fairer application of
Atkins and should serve as a guide for a national legal standard for use by state trial
courts to determine mental retardation. Specifically, Ohio’s use of preponderance of
the evidence is a more appropriate standard of proof for determining mental
retardation because it better reaches the overall goal in Atkins.33 Allowing the judge
to make the mental retardation determination protects the alleged mentally retarded
defendant from potential jury bias.34 Because Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of
mental retardation are substantially similar and mirror medical definitions of mental
retardation, either definition can be adopted as the national standard.35 The
procedures adopted by Ohio, however, weigh heavily in favor of their incorporation
into a national standard. Finally, although Ohio provides a better procedural
framework, the nature of mental retardation requires implementation of training
programs to protect mentally retarded persons accused of crimes.36
Part II of this Note discusses the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Atkins v. Virginia. Part III discusses Ohio’s framework for determining mental
retardation. Part IV discusses Georgia’s framework for determining mental
retardation. Part V discusses Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation,
and compares these definitions to each other and to definitions propounded by
medical organizations. Part VI compares Georgia’s “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard of proof with Ohio’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard and
concludes: Ohio’s “preponderance” standard is more appropriate for determining
mental retardation because it will best follow the purpose of Atkins. Part VII
evaluates the potential for jury bias when the jury determines mental retardation.
Ohio’s requirement that the judge determine whether the defendant is mentally
retarded for Atkins purposes ensures the defendant receives the protections Atkins
intended to guarantee. Part VIII explains how the different procedures adopted by
Ohio and Georgia may lead to an arbitrary application of Atkins, and therefore
recommends a uniform procedure be adopted to serve as a guide for all states
implementing the death penalty. Finally, part IX of this paper provides some
recommendations for training procedures in Ohio and Georgia to ensure alleged
mentally retarded capital defendants receive Atkins protections from the day they are

32
See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text; see also Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014
(defining mental retardation for Atkins purposes); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005)
(same); AMERICAN ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR]; AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th
rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
33

See infra notes 141-92 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 193-239 and accompanying text.

35

See infra notes 91-140 and accompanying text.

36

See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
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implicated in a crime and are protected against procedural bias resulting from their
handicap.
II. THE ATKINS DECISION
In Atkins, a Virginia state court convicted defendant Daryl Atkins of abduction,
capital murder, and armed robbery.37 He was sentenced to death.38 Atkins, along
with William Jones, abducted, robbed, and killed Eric Nesbitt.39 At trial, Jones and
Atkins each testified the other shot and killed Nesbitt.40 Jones’s testimony was “both
more coherent and credible than Atkins’[sic]” and was “obviously credited by the
jury and was sufficient to establish Atkins’[sic] guilt.”41 As a result, the State was
able to prove two aggravating circumstances against Atkins: Future dangerousness
and “vileness of the offense.”42
At the penalty phase of his trial, Atkins introduced mitigating evidence from a
forensic psychologist who testified that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”43
The psychologist based his conclusion on interviews with people acquainted with
Atkins, a standard intelligence test that indicated he had an I.Q. of fifty-nine, and a
review of his court and school records.44 The State sought to overcome Atkins’
mitigating evidence by presenting testimony from a witness who opined Atkins was
of “average intelligence, at least.”45 The State prevailed at its sentencing
recommendation and the Virginia jury sentenced him to death.46
Atkins appealed his sentence to the Virginia Supreme Court, arguing that he was
mentally retarded and, accordingly, could not be sentenced to death.47 The court
rejected Atkins’s claim and upheld the death sentence, refusing to reduce the
sentence based on his I.Q. score alone, relying principally on the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Penry v. Lynaugh.48 The Penry Court held the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude the execution of individuals solely on the basis of
mental retardation.49 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins to

37

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. Jones did not receive the death penalty because of a deal struck with the prosecution
that permitted him to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for testimony against
Atkins. Id. at 307 n.1.
42

Id. at 308.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 308-09.

45

Id. at 309.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 310.

48

Id.; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

49

Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

5

410

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:405

revisit the issue of whether the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates
the Eighth Amendment.50
Following the Court’s decision in Penry, state legislatures began to prohibit the
execution of the mentally retarded.51 This growing “national consensus”52 against
executing mentally retarded individuals “provides powerful evidence [to the Court]
that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.”53 Also, the execution of the mentally retarded
does not further any social purposes served by the death penalty.54 Specifically, the
Atkins Court acknowledged the death penalty serves both a retributive and a
deterrent purpose.55 The retributive purpose, however, is not served by executing
mentally retarded individuals because “[i]f culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser
culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.”56 Likewise, the execution of mentally retarded individuals does not
deter others from committing aggravated murder because “[e]xempting the mentally
retarded from [the death penalty] will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the
decision’ of other potential murderers.”57 Thus, the Atkins Court concluded that the
execution of mentally retarded individuals constitutes excessive punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, holding that “the Constitution ‘places a
substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded
offender.”58
Although the Atkins Court prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded, it
did not set forth a procedural standard for determining mental retardation.59 Instead,
the Court left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to prohibit the
execution of the mentally retarded.60 Similarly, the Court did not develop a
definition of mental retardation to guide the states, but instead merely cited several
clinical definitions in the footnotes of its opinion.61 This action is questionable
because, although the Atkins Court noted the difficulties in “determining which

50
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. Excessive punishments under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution are judged by currently prevailing standards. Id. at 311 (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII).
51

Id. at 314-15.

52

Id. at 316.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 319.

55

Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).

56

Id.

57

Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).

58

Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).

59

Id. at 317.

60

Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 416-17).

61

Id. at 308 n.3.
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offenders are in fact retarded,”62 it declined to set forth any standards to determine
mental retardation.63 “The Court noted that the only major disagreement regarding
the execution of mentally retarded persons, developing a method to determine
retardation, was to be left to the states.”64 This lack of standard created a variety of
different procedures in virtually all states that maintain the death penalty.65 In fact,
“[i]n many cases, especially those involving borderline mental retardation, the
defendant’s fate will depend, in large part, on the state in which his [or her] trial is
held.”66 These different procedures risk denying Eighth Amendment protections to
the approximately 360 mentally retarded death row inmates in the United States.67
Two such states, Ohio and Georgia, have vastly different schemes for determining
mental retardation. These two schemes demonstrate the uncertainty left to the states
by, and the inconsistency resulting from, the Court’s decision in Atkins.
III. OHIO’S PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MENTAL RETARDATION
Ohio did not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals until after
Atkins v. Virginia.68 In State v. Lott, the Ohio Supreme Court promulgated a
standard for use by trial courts in determining when a capital defendant is mentally
retarded and thus cannot be executed pursuant to Atkins.69 Defendant Gregory Lott
was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death.70 On appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court, Lott moved to vacate his death sentence, alleging he was
mentally retarded.71 After setting forth the standard for hearing Atkins claims, the

62

Id. at 317.

63

Orpen, supra note 21, at 86-87.

64

Tiffany A. Mann, Note, The Supreme Court Exempts Another Class from the Death
Penalty: Mentally Retarded Offenders – Atkins v. Virginia, 4 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 77, 89
(2003).
65
See Orpen, supra note 21, at 96 (citing state statutes that prohibit the execution of the
mentally retarded); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-618(C) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1102 (2005); CONN GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(2) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214623(d) (2005); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (LexisNexis 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(1) (West 2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(2) (LexisNexis 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(B)
(LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (Consol. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West 2005); Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011.
66

Orpen, supra note 21, at 102.

67

Mann, supra note 64, at 93; Orpen, supra note 21, at 83-84;

68

State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1011 (Ohio 2002).

69

Id.

70

Id. at 1013.

71

Id.
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court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Lott was mentally
retarded.72
For Atkins purposes, a capital defendant in Ohio is mentally retarded when he or
she has: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant
limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and
self-direction, and (3) onset [of mental retardation] before the age of 18.”73 There is
a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her I.Q. is
above seventy.74
Ohio’s procedure for determining mental retardation requires capital defendants
currently awaiting trial to raise mental retardation prior to trial.75 In Ohio, it is the
trial judge rather than the jury who reviews the evidence and determines whether the
defendant is mentally retarded.76 The trial judge must determine whether the
defendant proved his or her mental retardation by a “preponderance of the
evidence.”77 Ohio also permits those defendants already sentenced to death to file
within 180 days of the Lott opinion a petition for post-conviction relief raising an
Atkins claim.78
IV. GEORGIA’S PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MENTAL RETARDATION
Unlike Ohio, Georgia has statutorily prohibited the execution of mentally
retarded individuals since 1988.79 Under the statute, a capital defendant in Georgia is
mentally retarded if he or she has “significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which
manifested during the developmental period.”80
Also unlike Ohio, the determination of a Georgia capital defendant’s mental
retardation is made by the trial jury rather than the trial judge.81 The jury must find
the defendant to be mentally retarded “beyond a reasonable doubt.”82 The method by
which this determination is made is similar to an insanity inquiry: If the jury finds
72

Id. at 1016.

73

Id. at 1014.

74

Id. at 1014. This presumption has in the past been rebutted. See infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
75

Id. at 1016.

76

Id. at 1015.

77

Id. at 1015-16.

78

Id. at 1016. This Atkins claim will satisfy the timing requirements for a petition for
post-conviction relief set forth in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.23(A)(1)(b) because “the
Supreme Court has recognized a new federal right applying retroactively to convicted
defendants facing the death penalty.” Lott, 779 N.E.2d. at 1015.
79
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005); see also Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 878
(Ga. 2003) (“Atkins only established a federal constitutional prohibition on executing mentally
retarded criminals, while Georgia has had its own such prohibition since 1988.”).
80

§ 17-7-131(a)(3).

81

§ 17-7-131(c)(3).

82

Id.
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the defendant to be guilty of the crime but also finds the defendant to be mentally
retarded, then the jury returns a verdict of “guilty but mentally retarded.”83 Georgia
law mandates the jury be instructed on the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict
where expert testimony indicates the defendant may be mentally retarded.84
A defendant in Georgia not raising mental retardation at trial may still do so in a
petition for habeas corpus.85 These habeas claims can be heard and granted under
Georgia law which provides that, “[i]n all cases habeas corpus relief shall be granted
to avoid a miscarriage of justice.”86 Initially, defendants filing mental retardation
habeas claims arising from trials before the statute’s effective date were only
required to prove their mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.87
Currently, however, the preponderance standard is not applicable to mental
retardation claims raised after the statute’s effective date.88 Thus, Georgia
defendants raising mental retardation claims either at trial or by habeas corpus
petition must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they are mentally retarded.89
V. THE DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
Before entering into an in-depth comparison of Ohio’s and Georgia’s procedures
for determining mental retardation, it is first helpful to evaluate what it means to be
mentally retarded. Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation are
substantively similar to each other and also to modern medical definitions. Because
both Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions reflect the modern medical world’s
understanding of mental retardation, either could be adopted to supply a legal
definition of mental retardation for Atkins purposes.
In the United States today, approximately six to seven million persons suffer
from mental retardation.90 A number of factors predispose a person to mental
retardation. These factors include heredity, environmental influence, mental
disorders, pregnancy and perinatal problems (such as malnutrition or prematurity),
early alterations of embryonic development (for example, prenatal damage due to
toxins), and general medical conditions acquired during infancy or childhood.91 Two
national medical authorities, the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), have offered definitions and analyses

83

Id.

84

See Mack v. State, 425 S.E.2d 671, 672-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding a new trial
where expert testimony indicated defendant was mentally retarded but the trial court did not
instruct the jury that it could consider the verdict of guilty but mentally retarded).
85

See, e.g., Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1989) (permitting a defendant to
raise by habeas petition a mental retardation claim); Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 53 (Ga.
1998) (same).
86

Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 53; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-48(d) (2005).

87

Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 342.

88

Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 53.

89

Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622 (Ga. 2003).

90

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

91

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 45-46.
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of what constitutes mental retardation.92 These two definitions are similar to each
other and to Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation.
The American Psychiatric Association defines mental retardation as
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning…that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least
two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. The onset
must occur before age 18 years.93
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Textual Revision (DSM-IV-TR), covers all
mental disorders, including mental retardation, for children and adults.94 The DSMIV-TR sets forth several “degrees” of severity of mental retardation.95 Individuals
with an I.Q. level of between fifty and fifty-five to approximately seventy have “mild
mental retardation.”96 Mild mental retardation is the most common level of
retardation.97 Approximately eighty-five percent of those with mental retardation fall
into this category.98 Individuals with an I.Q. level between thirty-five and forty to
fifty and fifty-five have “moderate mental retardation.”99 About ten percent of those
with mental retardation suffer from “moderate retardation.”100 Individuals with an
I.Q. level between twenty and twenty-five to thirty-five and forty have “severe
mental retardation.”101 About three to four percent of those with mental retardation
suffer from “severe mental retardation.”102 Approximately one to two percent of
mentally retarded persons have an I.Q. below twenty or twenty-five and suffer from
“profound mental retardation.”103
The AAMR defines mental retardation as
substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently

92
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002) (citing definitions of mental
retardation by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric
Association).
93

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41.

94

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32.

95

Id. at 42.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 42.

100

Id. at 43.

101

Id. at 42.

102

Id. at 43.

103

Id. at 42-44.
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with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics,
leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests itself before age 18.104
Unlike the DSM-IV-TR, the AAMR does not offer any break down of “degrees”
of mental retardation. The two definitions are similar, however, as both contain
several common elements.
Common elements in both the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR definitions of mental
retardation include the following: significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, and onset before age
eighteen.105 Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning refers to a low
I.Q., usually below seventy or seventy five.106 The I.Q. is measured by an
assessment with one or more of the standardized, individually administered
intelligence tests.107 There is a margin of error in the I.Q. tests of approximately five
points.108 Adaptive skills measure how effectively individuals are able to cope with
common demands of everyday life without support, and how well they meet the
standards of personal independence expected of one in their age group, community
setting, and sociocultural background.109 These adaptive skill areas include
communication, self-care, social skills, self-direction, functional academics, health
and safety, home living, leisure, and work.110 Adaptive skills are evidenced by
reliable independent sources such as teacher evaluations, and educational,
developmental, and medical history.111 Defining these adaptive skills, however, has
been difficult and has in the past led to challenges of mental retardation diagnoses in
criminal cases.112

104

AAMR, supra note 32, at 5.

105

Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41 (setting forth the definition of mental
retardation), with AAMR, supra note 32, at 5 (same).
106
Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41 (stating that an I.Q. of about seventy or
below constitutes significantly subaverage intellectual functioning), with AAMR, supra note
32, at 5 (“[A]n I.Q. standard score of approximately 70 or 75 or below, based on an
assessment that includes one or more individually administered general intelligence tests
developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual functioning.”).
107

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41. These standardized intelligence tests include the
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children, third edition, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for
Children, and the Standford-Binet, fourth edition. Id.
108

Id.

109

Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 42 (“[H]ow effectively individuals cope with
common life demands and how well they meet standards of personal independence expected
of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community setting.”),
with AAMR, supra note 32, at 6 (“These skill areas are central to successful life functioning
and are frequently related to the need for supports for persons with mental retardation.”).
110

AAMR, supra note 32, at 6; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41.

111

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 42.

112

AAMR, supra note 32, at 149.
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It is important to test individually for mental retardation in order to provide
adequate attention to the individual’s ethnic, cultural, or linguistic background, each
of which may affect test results.113 I.Q. tests have been criticized by some researchers
because they may be biased by minority status or low socioeconomic standing.114
I.Q. tests still have some value, despite criticism, because they “provide[] the
practical benefit of a consistent standard generally accepted by mental health
professionals.”115 Further, measuring adaptive skills will supplement I.Q. tests as an
indicator of the defendant’s mental retardation.116
Because mental retardation is manifested initially during the time in which
developmental processes are occurring, both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR require
that mental retardation manifest itself before the age of eighteen.117 Requiring
mental retardation to manifest itself before the age of eighteen serves another less
evident purpose: It operates as an intrinsic protection against feigning mental
retardation.118 This is so because individuals seeking to “feign” mental retardation119
to escape the death penalty will have to show its onset prior to age eighteen.
Because mental retardation is often documented at an early age through intelligence
tests, it is particularly difficult for a non-mentally retarded individual to show that, at
an early age, he or she suffered from mental retardation.120
Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation are very similar to those
propounded by the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR. Adopting one of these definitions
to serve as the legal standard ensures that courts apply Atkins consistently and
eliminates any possible confusion that may result from utilizing a complex definition
of mental retardation.121 Although many other definitions of mental retardation are
similar to Ohio’s and Georgia’s, differences in statutory wording suggest states with
different definitions of mental retardation may undergo a slightly different analysis.
For example, Florida defines mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”122 Although this definition
113

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 46.

114

Bing, supra note 26, at 73-75.

115

Id. at 75.

116

Lyndsey Sloan, Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The Evolution of a
National Consensus Granting the Mentally Retarded Sanctuary, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 351, 365
(2003).
117

AAMR, supra note 32, at 16; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41.

118

Bing, supra note 26, at 90.

119

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra
note 178.
120

Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Defendant to Death: Charting the
Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death
Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 916 (2001).
121

Raines, supra note 25, at 197.

122

FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2005); see also Raines, supra note 25, at 197 n.194 (citing
Florida and Kansas statutes).
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appears in-line with Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions, a closer examination reveals a
potential for confusion. Florida defines “significantly subaverge general intellectual
functioning” as “two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a
standardized intelligence test.”123 This definition, different from Ohio’s and
Georgia’s, appears facially more difficult for the average person to understand.124
Creating a national definition of mental retardation would ensure that all states
undergo the same analysis in determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded.
Using definitions that are similar to modern medical definitions of mental retardation
would ensure that the legal world is in accord with the medical world. Also,
requiring a definition of mental retardation that mirrors the medical world’s
definition would ensure that Atkins protections are equally available to all.
As discussed above, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation contains the three
main elements covered in both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental
retardation: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations in two or
more adaptive skills, and onset before age eighteen.125 Ohio creates a rebuttable
presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her I.Q. is above
seventy.126 Therefore, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation acknowledges the
problems inherent in I.Q. testing127 and allows an individual with an I.Q. slightly
higher than seventy to rebut the presumption and prove that he or she is mentally
retarded.128 Also, Ohio’s definition reflects the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR
assumption that a low I.Q. generally means an I.Q. below seventy or seventy-five.129
Ohio does not exclude from the death penalty individuals who would otherwise meet
its definition of mental retardation but for the fact that their brain injury and adaptive
behavior deficits occurred after age eighteen.130 In one Ohio case, State v. Stallings,
the defendant raised an Atkins claim seeking to escape execution on the grounds that
he was mentally retarded.131 After evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied
Stallings’s Atkins claim because he could not establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the onset of his mental retardation occurred before he reached age
123
§ 921.137(1). Kansas offers the same definition of “significantly subaverge general
intellectual functioning.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01(i) (2005) (“‘Significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning’ means performance which is two or more standard deviations
from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified by the secretary.”).
124

See Raines, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that the older definition of mental
retardation, like that used by Florida, was difficult for laypersons to understand).
125

State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002).

126

Id.

127

See Bing, supra note 26, at 75 (“The IQ score should continue to be questioned as an
absolute measure of intelligence, but since there is no adequate replacement, it should not be
ignored.”).
128
Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014. This presumption has, in fact, been rebutted. See infra note
185 and accompanying text.
129

AAMR, supra note 32, at 5; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41.

130

State v. Stallings, No. 21969, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4167, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.

2004).
131

Id. at *2.
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eighteen.132 Thus, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation follows both the AAMR
and the DSM-IV-TR definitions.
Georgia’s definition of mental retardation also contains the three main elements
of the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental retardation. There are
some notable differences, however, as the Georgia statute does not expressly require
a set amount of impairments in adaptive skills (the AAMR, DSM-IV-TR, and Ohio
definitions require at least two)133 and also requires mental retardation to manifest
itself during the “developmental period” as opposed to age eighteen.134 Despite these
facial differences, Georgia’s definition of mental retardation operates similarly to the
AAMR, the DSM-IV-TR, and the Ohio definitions. First, the Georgia Supreme
Court has looked for deficiencies in two or more adaptive skills to determine the
defendant did not possess the requisite impairments to be mentally retarded.135
Second, the Georgia Supreme Courts has treated the manifestation of mental
retardation during the “developmental period” as occurring before age eighteen.136
Finally, Georgia courts appear to have adopted the assumption that mental
retardation is usually indicated by an I.Q. score below seventy.137 On the whole, the
Georgia definition appears in operation similar to the Ohio, the AAMR, and the
DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental retardation. The slight difference in wording,
however, between Georgia’s definition and the other definitions of mental
retardation, may result in confusion in its application. Accordingly, to ensure
consistency, only one of these definitions should be utilized as a national definition
of mental retardation for Atkins purposes.138
Overall, the Ohio and Georgia definitions appear to match those offered by the
AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR. As such, either of these definitions could be adopted
to serve as a national legal definition to guide states in determining mental
retardation. Requiring only one definition reduces the possibility of confusion that
may result from facially complicated statutes such as Florida’s.139 A uniform

132

Id. at *10; see also State v. Thomas, 779 N.E.2d 1017, 1038 (Ohio 2002) (“[E]vidence
of defendant’s mental deficiencies might be traced to his 1981 injury, when [defendant] was in
his mid-20s, and would therefore not meet the definition of ‘mental retardation’ of most states
that prohibit execution of the mentally retarded.”).
133

Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014 (holding that a capital defendant in Ohio alleging that he or
she is mentally retarded must show “significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills”)
(emphasis added).
134

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (2005).

135

See, e.g., Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000) (looking to defendant’s
“interaction with others, his letter writing, newspaper reading, and sports activities” to
determine defendant did not meet the statutory definition of mental retardation).
136

Id. at 79 (“Evidence was adduced from which the jury could have found that IQ tests
administered to Foster when he was ten and nearly seventeen years old showed that he was not
mentally retarded.”).
137

See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 875 (Ga. 2003) (“The generally accepted
I.Q. score for an indication of mental retardation is 70 or below.”).
138

Raines, supra note 25, at 197.

139

See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2005); see also infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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definition also would ensure that all states that impose the death penalty offer Atkins
protections equally.
VI. MENTAL RETARDATION SHOULD BE PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE
“Preponderance of the evidence” is a lower standard of proof than “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”140 Specifically, it is the lowest burden of proof used by American
courts.141 Preponderance of the evidence has been defined as “superior evidentiary
weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt,
is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather
than the other.”142 In other words, preponderance of the evidence translates into
“more likely than not.”143 Conversely, beyond a reasonable doubt has been defined
as “the doubt that prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt,
or the belief that there is a real possibility that a defendant is not guilty.”144 In other
words, proof beyond a reasonable doubt translates into “proof to a virtual
certainty.”145 These definitions conform to instructions given to juries by Ohio and
Georgia courts.146 Though usually only applied in civil cases, the preponderance
standard is particularly applicable to mental retardation because of the great risk of
error; an erroneous finding of “not mentally retarded” results in a death sentence,
whereas an erroneous finding of “mentally retarded” results in a life sentence.147
Ohio’s use of the preponderance of the evidence standard is the better standard
for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded. First, Georgia’s
use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine mental retardation is

140

Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002).
141

Id.

142

Raines, supra note 25, at 198 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999)).

143

Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251.

144

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004).

145

Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251.

146

See GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 209.60 (2003) (defining proof
by a “preponderance of the evidence”); 4-503 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 503.011(5) (2005)
(defining proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”); 4-409 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 409.60(2)
(2005) (defining proof by a “preponderance of the evidence”). The Georgia pattern jury
instructions do not appear to define proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Although Georgia but
not Ohio submits the mental retardation issue to the jury, the instructions provided by both
states show general uniformity in defining these burdens of proof.
147

See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005) (requiring a jury who finds a defendant
“guilty but mentally retarded” to sentence the defendant to “imprisonment for life”); State v.
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ohio 2002) (remanding to trial court to determine whether the
defendant is mentally retarded and cannot be sentenced to death.); see also Raines, supra note
25, at 199 (arguing that states should err on the side of caution and adopt a lower standard of
proof for use in determining mental retardation).
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inconsistent with its burden of proving affirmative defenses.148 Second, it is better to
have a lower standard of proof when dealing with individuals possessing reduced
mental capacity.149 Also, there is no evidence to suggest that non-mentally retarded
defendants are able to take advantage of the lower standard of proof in Ohio in order
to escape the death penalty.150 The higher standard of proof could cause inconsistent
and arbitrary results; a defendant adjudged mentally retarded in Ohio could be
adjudged not mentally retarded in Georgia, which would defeat the purpose of
Atkins.151
The difference of imposing each burden of proof is clear: A Georgia defendant
trying to establish his mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt would have to
provide significantly more evidence. For example, he would need more experts to
testify as to his mental capacity.152 This increased burden is unduly harsh particularly
because “[i]t is difficult for the mentally retarded defendant to contribute adequately
to his [or her] defense, regardless of whether he [or she] has been declared competent
by the court.”153 An Ohio defendant attempting to prove his or her mental retardation
by a preponderance of the evidence would only have to show “more-likely-than-not”
that he or she is mentally retarded to obtain a life sentence.154 By contrast, a Georgia
defendant would have to show by “virtual certainty” that he or she is mentally
retarded to escape the death penalty.155 Because the mentally retarded have an
underdeveloped conception of blameworthiness, a lack of knowledge of basic facts,
and increased susceptibility to the influence of authority figures,156 a lesser standard
of proof appears necessary to accommodate retarded individuals.157 Accordingly, the

148
See, e.g., Chandle v. State, 198 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1973) (holding defendants in Georgia
must prove affirmative defenses by a “preponderance of the evidence”); See also Raines, supra
note 25, at 198.
149

Bing, supra note 26, at 135; Raines, supra note 25, at 199.

150

See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 178-86 and
accompanying text.
151

See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95.

152

See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 489 (1985) (determining mental retardation often requires a
“personality assessment, adaptive behavior assessment, moral development examination,
speech and language evaluation, motoric functioning evaluation, or academic achievement
evaluation – as well as mental retardation forensic evaluations in the indicated legal issues”).
153

Bing, supra note 26, at 145; see also Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“Because of the
nature of mental retardation, it is often more difficult for these offenders to contribute
adequately to their defense.”).
154

Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251.

155

Id.

156

Bing, supra note 26, at 72.

157

See Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“[A] lesser standard of proof than reasonable doubt
should be used because a higher standard places a greater burden on the mentally retarded
defendant.”).
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preponderance standard “acknowledges the procedural difficulties mentally retarded
people face when they encounter the criminal justice system.”158
Georgia’s use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is inconsistent
with Georgia’s and Ohio’s burdens of proving affirmative defenses.159 “Affirmative
defenses are those in which the defendant admits doing the act charged but seeks to
justify, excuse, or mitigate his [or her] conduct.”160 Defendants in Georgia and Ohio
bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence.161 Georgia’s burden of proving mental retardation is thus inconsistent with
the burden necessary to prove affirmative defenses. As stated above, a defendant
alleging mental retardation has a lessened criminal culpability, which justifies
reducing his or her sentence from death to life imprisonment.162 Similarly, a
defendant raising an affirmative defense seeks to “justify, excuse, or mitigate his
conduct.”163 Therefore, it is inconsistent to permit a defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his or her conduct was justified by way of an
affirmative defense, but then to require the same defendant to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that his or her sentence should be reduced because of mental
retardation.
As mentioned above, the determination of mental retardation in Georgia works
similar to an insanity inquiry: A jury finds the defendant to be “guilty but mentally
retarded” if the requisite criteria for establishing mental retardation are deemed to be
met.164 There is, however, an illogical difference between these two inquiries and
their respective standards of proof. A Georgia defendant alleging to be insane must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did “not have mental
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to [the crime].”165 If the
defendant is successful in his or her insanity claim, the defendant is “committed to a
state mental health facility until such time, if ever, that the court is satisfied that he or
she should be released pursuant to law.”166 By contrast, a Georgia defendant with
mental retardation must show beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she has
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated
158

Bing, supra note 26, at 134-35.

159

See Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“[M]ental retardation will be an affirmative
defense.”).
160

Carlson v. State, 524 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).

161

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (West 2005) (stating defendant must prove an
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence); Chandle, 198 S.E.2d at 291 (same).
162

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).

163

Carlson, 524 S.E.2d at 286.

164

Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(1) (2005) (“The defendant may be found ‘not
guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime’ if he meets the criteria of Code Section
16-3-2 or 16-3-3 at the time of the commission of the crime.”), with § 17-7-131(c)(3) (“The
defendant may be found ‘guilty but mentally retarded’ if the jury, or court acting as trier of
facts, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and is
mentally retarded.”).
165

§ 16-3-2 (2005).

166

§ 17-7-131(b)(3)(A).
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with impairments in adaptive behavior which manifested during the developmental
period.”167 Thus, the mentally retarded defendant likewise has a diminished
culpability but, unlike the insane defendant who seeks to avoid jail, only seeks a
reduction in sentence.168 It is therefore inconsistent for Georgia to require the
purported retarded defendant to prove his or her mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt, and only to require the alleged insane defendant to establish his or
her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.169 Georgia should lower the burden
of proving mental retardation to that necessary for proving insanity.
Georgia’s requirement of proving mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt
is also inconsistent with the burden of proof previously applied by Georgia courts to
establish mental retardation.170 Specifically, defendants alleging mental retardation
before the adoption of the statute were only required to prove mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence.171 Defendants alleging mental retardation after the
effective date of Georgia’s statute, however, must prove mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt.172 The result is unfair because “[i]n effect, the [Georgia] court
stated that by passing an exemption of the death penalty for the mentally retarded,
the legislature meant to make it harder for a mentally retarded defendant to prove his
[or her] retardation.”173
More pragmatic reasons exist for requiring mental retardation be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. Mentally retarded individuals by definition have a
reduced mental capacity and have a greater difficulty contributing to their defense
than do non-mentally retarded defendants.174 Also, mentally retarded individuals, as
a result of their reduced mental capacity, are more susceptible to police coercion.175
167

§ 17-7-131(a)(3).

168

See § 17-7-131(j) (2005) (“In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought
which commences on or after July 1, 1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty
but mentally retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall
sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life.”).
169

See, e.g., Durham v. State, 238 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ga. 1977) (“The defendant bears the
burden of showing, by preponderance of the evidence, that he was not mentally responsible at
the time of the alleged crime.”).
170

Bing, supra note 26, at 135. Compare Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (Ga.
1988) (holding that defendants who allege mental retardation prior to the effective date of GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2005) are required to prove mental retardation by a “preponderance of
the evidence”), with Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Ga. 1998) (holding that defendants who
are tried after the effective date of section 17-7-131 are required to prove mental retardation
“beyond a reasonable doubt”).
171

Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 342-43.

172

Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 54; § 17-7-131(c)(3).

173

Bing, supra note 26, at 135.

174

Id. at 145; Raines, supra note 25, at 199.

175

Entzeroth, supra note 120, at 917; Raines, supra note 25, at 199; see also Ellis &.
Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428, 446 (arguing the mentally retarded are predisposed to
affirmatively answering questions they find desirable, which can “directly affect the likelihood
of receiving a biased response”).
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In fact, evidence produced in Atkins shows that Atkins’s testimony was less credible
and coherent, possibly due to diminished mental capacity, than his alleged
accomplice, whose testimony “was obviously credited by the jury and was sufficient
to establish Atkins’[sic] guilt.”176 As evidenced by Atkins, testimony of allegedly
mentally retarded defendants may be given less weight than testimony of defendants
who do not allege mental retardation.177 Therefore, the mentally retarded should be
afforded safeguards such as a reduced standard of proof to compensate for their
intellectual limitations.
One criticism of using the preponderance standard is that non-mentally retarded
capital defendants may be successful “feigning” mental retardation to escape the
death penalty.178 Cases in Ohio and Georgia, however, suggest otherwise. For
example, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the pre-statutory preponderance
standard and found a defendant to be not mentally retarded by a preponderance of
the evidence.179 The court found that I.Q. tests administered to the defendant
“showed that he was not mentally retarded [and the lower I.Q. scores] resulted from
depression or malingering.”180 The defendant was unsuccessful in proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally retarded.181 Thus, it appears
unnecessary for Georgia to utilize a higher standard of proof.
Ohio courts have also effectively used the preponderance standard. In one case, a
defendant with an I.Q. of sixty-nine could not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was mentally retarded.182 In so finding, the court relied on the
defendant’s writings and lack of significant limitations in adaptive skills.183 In
another Ohio case, by contrast, a defendant with an I.Q. over seventy was able to
overcome the rebuttable presumption184 and prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was mentally retarded.185 To find the defendant mentally retarded,
the court relied on evidence showing the defendant’s subaverage intellectual
functioning and significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills that occurred
176

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).

177

Id. at 307.

178

Matthew Debbis, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment Prohibits the Execution of Mentally Retarded Defendants: Atkins v. Virginia, 41
DUQ. L. REV. 811, 824 (2003); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
argued that unlike insane capital defendants who, upon a finding of insanity, risk spending
time in a mental institution until he or she is cured, “the capital defendant who feigns mental
retardation risks nothing at all.” Id. Justice Scalia’s criticism is also applicable to a reduced
standard of proof; a reduced standard of proof offers greater opportunity for capital defendants
to “feign” mental retardation to avoid the death sentence.
179

Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000).

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

State v. Were, No. C-030485, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 348, at *30 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
4, 2005).
183
184
185

Id.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
State v. Gumm, No. B-9205608, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 9, 2005).
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before defendant reached age eighteen.186 Thus, Ohio does not appear to allow nonmentally retarded defendants who allege mental retardation to escape the death
penalty.
Ohio and Georgia cases demonstrate that requiring defendants to prove mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is more appropriate. In these states,
courts work carefully to ensure that a defendant is mentally retarded before reducing
the sentence.187 Case law in Ohio and Georgia suggests that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is sufficient to prevent a capital defendant from “feigning” mental
retardation in order to escape the death penalty.188 Even if an individual is
incorrectly adjudged to be mentally retarded, arguably “[i]t is better to incorrectly
find that a person is mentally retarded and impose a lesser penalty than to execute
someone who is incorrectly found to be not retarded.”189
Because of the different standards of proof, it is possible that the same defendant
could be found mentally retarded in Ohio but not in Georgia.190 In other words, a
defendant may succeed in proving his or her mental retardation by a preponderance
of the evidence, but he may be unable to prove his mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Georgia defendant, though adjudged mentally retarded in
Ohio, may still be put to death. This works contrary to Atkins, which aims to
prohibit the execution of all mentally retarded capital defendants, not just those
defendants that all states agree are mentally retarded.191
VII. ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE MENTAL RETARDATION CREATES A RISK
OF BIAS
Jurors may be biased toward a capital defendant, and an allegation of mental
retardation potentially exacerbates this bias. Jurors, who are unfamiliar with the law
and its application, may ignore the court’s instructions and instead “impose
distinctive rules and procedures that mix various aspects of weighing, matching, and
moralizing.”192 Further, a capital jury may disregard statutory aggravating and
mitigating sentencing guidelines and instead base guilt purely on what it subjectively
thinks appropriate.193 In fact, one study found that forty percent of “capital jurors
186

Id. at 6-9.

187

It is noteworthy that Were was unable to prove he was mentally retarded by a
“preponderance of the evidence” even in the absence of the rebuttable presumption that he was
not mentally retarded. Were, 2005 LEXIS 348, at *30. Compare this with Gumm who was
able to overcome the rebuttable presumption and prove by a “preponderance of the evidence”
he was mentally retarded. Gumm, slip op. at 1.
188

See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.

189

Raines, supra note 25, at 199.

190

See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95.

191

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).

192

William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1073 (1995).
193
Id. at 1074. One study reported that a majority of jurors (thirty-five out of fifty-four)
were influenced little or not at all by statutory aggravating and mitigating guidelines. Id. The
most common aggravator in the study was “a presumption of death as the appropriate
punishment as indicated by ‘the view that death was to be the punishment for first degree
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believed that they were required to impose the death penalty if they found that the
crime was heinous, vile, or depraved, and [thirty percent] thought that the death
penalty was required if they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the
future.”194 Indeed, capital jurors are often concerned that the capital defendant will
cause harm to others in the future.195 Because jurors may already be predisposed to
bias toward the capital defendant,196 it is necessary to examine how this bias may
affect the capital defendant alleging mental retardation.
A question Atkins left unanswered is whether the defendant alleging mental
retardation has a right to have a judge or a jury decide the issue.197 Ohio’s and
Georgia’s Atkins procedures offer different answers to this question. Ohio requires
the judge to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded for Atkins
purposes.198 By contrast, Georgia requires the jury to determine whether the
defendant is mentally retarded.199 Although the judge may harbor some bias toward
the alleged mentally retarded defendant, the jury presents a greater risk of biasing the
defendant. A judge is trained200 to be impartial, and takes an oath to that effect.201
Likewise, the jury is required to give an oath pledging impartiality202 and may be
subject to removal for cause.203 Jurors, however, unlike judges, do not regularly204
murder, or at least that death was presumed appropriate unless [the] defendant could persuade
the jury otherwise.’” Id.
194
Id. at 1091. This study was based on three to four hour interviews with eighty to one
hundred twenty capital jurors from several states. Id. at 1043.
195

Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1539 (1998).
196

The author takes no general stance on jury bias at capital trials. The purpose of this
information is to suggest that juries may be biased toward capital defendants, and this potential
for bias increases dramatically with a mental retardation claim.
197

Orpen, supra note 21, at 95.

198

State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002).

199

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3).

200

Pursuant to its ethical rules, Ohio has set up a judicial college to “[p]rovide a
comprehensive program of continuing education for the judges . . . of [Ohio].” SUP. CT. RULES
FOR THE GOV’T OF THE JUDICIARY OF OHIO R. V § 1(B)(2), available at
http://www.sconet.state. oh.us/Rules/government/#rulev.
201

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (2005) (setting forth oath of office for judges); see
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 107.05 (2005) (“A judge of a court of record . . . or judge of a
county court, shall be ineligible to perform any duty pertaining to his office until he presents
to the proper official a legal certificate of his election or appointment, and receives from the
governor a commission to fill such office.”). Thus, the judge must receive support from the
governor of Ohio before he or she can perform his or her duties as judge. See Id.
202

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-138 (2005) (“Each panel of the trial jury shall take the
following oath: ‘You shall well and truly try each case submitted to you during the present
term and a true verdict give, according to the law as given you in charge and the opinion you
entertain of the evidence produced to you, to the best of your skill and knowledge, without
favor or affection to either party, provided you are not discharged from the consideration of
the case submitted. So help you God.”).
203

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-164 (2005).
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weigh facts impartially and are usually not skilled in the law.205 Because of the
judge’s training and experience with the law, it is less likely the judge will succumb
to bias on a particularly sensitive issue such as mental retardation. Thus, Ohio’s
mandate that the judge determine mental retardation is most appropriate here because
the jury has a greater risk of biasing the defendant and making an incorrect
determination of the defendant’s retardation.
Mentally retarded individuals behave in a variety of different ways. They do not
have specific personality or behavioral features.206 They may be passive, placid,
dependant, or aggressive and impulsive.207 In other words, their retardation may be
difficult to recognize or distinguish. Mentally retarded individuals may alienate
juries by smiling, sleeping, or staring in court, which may give the jury “a false
impression of callousness or lack of remorse.”208 It is therefore entirely possible that
jurors may misunderstand the mentally retarded defendant and fail to appreciate the
difference between guilt and culpability. Jurors
see a defendant who looks normal, is not manifestly “crazy,” and they do
not grasp for the profound yet subtle ways a person with retardation is
limited in his capacity to understand the world around him and to act
appropriately. They see a defendant who is not acting “remorseful” in the
courtroom and they think it is because he is callous and heartless rather
than understanding that a person with mental retardation may not fully
comprehend what is happening. Finally, jurors can see mental retardation
as an aggravating factor, i.e. they believe it portends that the defendant’s
future dangerousness, and they are worried that if given a prison sentence
he will one day be released to society and commit another violent
crime.209
The jury’s preexisting bias toward a capital defendant may have a heightened
impact on a capital defendant alleging mental retardation. This bias may be deepseeded, as evidenced by the fact that the mentally retarded in the past have been

204

See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-3 (2005) (“No person shall be compellable to serve on the
grand or trial jury of the superior court or on any jury in other courts for more than four weeks
in any year.”). Unlike the judge who sits for an elected term of years, the jury sits only for a
few weeks.
205
See Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins the Antithesis or Apotheosis of AntiDiscrimination
Principles?: Sorting Out the Groupwide Effects of Exempting People with Mental Retardation
from the Death Penalty, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1107 (2004) (arguing that capital juries “often
treat mental disorder not as a mitigating circumstance (as the law requires) but as an
aggravating circumstance supporting imposition of the death penalty”); see also Bing, supra
note 26, at 89 (“Jurors may deem the defendant’s retardation irrelevant if he is declared
competent to stand trial.”); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 39 (2000) (reporting that some jurors believe they could only consider
a mitigating factor if it was included in the state’s death penalty statute).
206

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 44.

207

Id.

208

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

209

Id.
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referred to as “idiots” and were often sterilized and segregated from society.210 The
mentally retarded were in the past believed to be more criminally dangerous than
non-retarded persons.211 Although mental health professionals have rejected these
stereotypes,212 they may linger in jurors’ minds and can play a role in sentencing and
determining guilt. There is an assumption that mental disorders create an increased
risk that the person will harm himself, herself or others.213 In fact, in a recent survey,
participants “reported less competence and increased expectations of violence if they
labeled the . . . person as having a mental illness.”214 Also, the mentally retarded face
hostility, condescension, and stereotyping both at school and at work.215 These
stereotypes also make themselves public on television, as “what passes for humor on
television programs such as ‘Saturday Night Live’ often consists of the presentation
of demeaning stereotypes of children and adults with mental retardation . . . .”216
Jurors typically show little mercy in making a sentencing recommendation if the
capital defendant shows no remorse.217 As discussed above, the mentally retarded
often do not understand the proceedings transpiring around them,218 they have poor
attention span and focus,219 and they often attempt to prevent discovery of their
handicap.220 Such behavior may appear to a jury as lack of remorse, when instead it
is a side effect of the defendant’s mental handicap. Thus, the juror, who may be
unfamiliar with the behaviors characteristic of mental retardation may fail to
recognize retardation and accordingly fail to find the defendant “guilty but mentally
retarded,” leaving open the possibility of a death sentence.221 One scholar has stated
210
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 416, 419 (“The measures alarmists thought
necessary to prevent the corrosion of society by the presumed criminality of retarded people
included the sterilization of all ‘feeble-minded’ people and their permanent segregation from
society.”).
211

Id. at 419.

212

Id. at 420.

213

Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness,
and the Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1339, 1339 (1999).
214

Id. at 1343. Although mental illness differs from mental retardation, it is important to
note that the public, including jurors, are often unaware of the differences between mental
illness and mental retardation. See Bing, supra note 26, at 87 (“Jurors are unlikely to have a
full grasp of mental retardation, including the difference between this condition and mental
illness.”).
215

Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disability Act and Employment: A NonRetrospecive, 52 ALA. L. REV. 375, 398 (2000).
216

Id. at 398-99.

217

Garvey, supra note 195, at 1539.

218

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

219

Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 429.

220

Id. at 429-30.
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that, “[s]imply put, there is a grave risk that juries do not understand the issues [of
mental retardation] well enough to make the life and death decision required of them.
Mental retardation remains, to most people, a mysterious affliction.”222
Some jurors also believe mental retardation makes the capital defendant more
dangerous.223 For example, one juror explained, “[i]t appears to us that there is all
the more reason to execute a killer if he is also. . . retarded. Killers often kill again;
[a] retarded killer is more to be feared than a . . . normal killer. There is also far less
possibility of his ever becoming a useful citizen.”224 Although Georgia jurors are
required to determine mental retardation at the penalty phase of trial, if the jurors
reject the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict,225 mental retardation becomes
nothing more than a mitigating circumstance that the jury can give little weight.226
Juries at the sentencing phase may treat mental retardation as an aggravating
circumstance rather than a mitigating factor.227 The jury thus could, because of want
of proof or even bias, refuse to find the defendant “guilty but mentally retarded,”
choose to give little weight to the defendant’s retardation as a mitigating factor, and
sentence him or her to death.
Though evidence suggests that some jurors may be biased, not all are. Many
jurors may weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence pursuant to statutory
221
Although a defendant raising an Atkins claim will be telegraphing to the jury that he
may be mentally retarded, the jury, uneducated in the medical field, may disregard, or fail to
understand the retardation claim and attribute the defendant’s behavior to his criminality.
222

Dick-Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 723-24.

223

See Slobogin, supra note 205, at 1107 (“Research clearly shows that, despite the fact
that offenders with serious disorders are no more likely to reoffend [sic] than the general
offender population, the public tends to equate mental disorder with dangerousness.”);
Pescosolido et al., supra note 213, at 1341, cites a study in which “[a]lmost 17% of the sample
indicated that even the ‘troubled person’ was either very or somewhat likely to do something
violent toward others. That percentage rose to 33.3% for the depression vignette and to more
than 60% for the schizophrenia vignette.” Id. Although mental illness and mental retardation
are different disorders, the public, including jurors, are often unable to ascertain the difference.
See Bing, supra note 26, at 87 (“Jurors are unlikely to have a full grasp of mental retardation,
including the difference between this condition and mental illness.”); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. HEALTH & PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667,
667 n.16 (2000) (noting “the boundaries between [mental retardation and mental illness] are
ill-defined and considerable overlap can exist”).
224

Jamie M. Billotte, Note, Is it Justified? - The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 333, 344 (1994) (quoting Upholding Law and Order,
HARTSVILLE MESSENGER, June 24, 1987, at 5B). Although this was stated pre-Atkins, a juror
today with similar feelings could choose to ignore the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict
and vote for death out of feelings that the mentally retarded defendant, because of his or her
retardation, may act out violently in the future.
225

Bing, supra note 26, at 89 (“Jurors may deem the defendant’s retardation irrelevant if
he is declared competent to stand trial.”).
226

Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680, 695 (Ga. 1994).

227

Bing, supra note 26, at 86; see also, Slobogin, supra note 205, at 1107 (“Capital
sentencing juries…often treat mental disorder not as a mitigating circumstance (as the law
requires) but as an aggravating circumstance supporting the imposition of the death penalty.”).
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guidelines.228 Further, many jurors who believe a defendant to be mentally retarded
have reported feeling sympathy or pity for the defendant.229 The more a juror
reported feeling sympathy or pity for the defendant, the more likely the juror was to
cast his or her vote at the start of deliberations for a life sentence.230 Most jurors
relying on feelings of sympathy or pity to make their first vote usually stick with that
vote.231 Thus, some jurors may obey statutory edict and, although they did not find
the defendant “guilty but mentally retarded,” allow the defendant’s mental
retardation as a mitigating factor to weigh in favor of a life sentence.232
There are also protections available in the voir dire process for Georgia capital
defendants alleging mental retardation. Georgia permits the individual examination
of jurors in capital cases.233 This examination may include questioning jurors on
preexisting opinions of guilt or innocence toward the defendant and on prejudice or
bias toward the defendant.234 Jurors who may be biased towards the defendant may
be excused for cause.235 The trial court has authority to control the scope of voir dire,
and can thus control the questioning to ensure prospective jurors will not be biased
towards the alleged mentally retarded capital defendant.236 Although the court may
exercise these safeguards by questioning jurors during voir dire, it is difficult to
remove a juror for cause. Indeed,
a venireman cannot be excluded for cause unless he makes it
unmistakably clear that (1) his attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt,
or that (2) he would automatically vote against the imposition of the death
penalty in the case regardless of the evidence that might be developed at
trial.237
228

Bowers, supra note 192, at 1073.

229

Garvey, supra note 205, at 57.

230

Id. at 62.

231

Id. at 66.

232

Although in Georgia the judge has discretion to determine the length of sentence during
the sentencing phase, if the jury recommends a life sentence, the judge must abide by the
jury’s decision. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (2005) (“Unless the jury trying the case
makes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and recommends the death
sentence in its verdict, the court shall not sentence the defendant to death.”) (emphasis added).
233

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (2005).

234

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-164(a)(1)-(2) (2005).

235

§ 15-12-164(d); see also Fults v. State, 548 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Ga. 2001) (“A
prospective juror who holds some opinion about the guilt of a criminal defendant need be
excused only when it is shown that the opinion is so fixed and definite that the juror will be
unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence and the charge of
the trial court.”).
236
See Lawler v. State, 576 S.E.2d 841, 848 (Ga. 2003) (“The scope of voir dire is largely
left to the trial court’s discretion, and it is not error for the trial court to exclude voir dire
questions that do not deal directly with the juror’s responsibilities in the case.”).
237

Redd v. State, 252 S.E.2d 383, 385 (Ga. 1979).
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Given the certainty necessary to remove a juror for cause, it appears possible for
a juror to harbor feelings of bias toward the mentally retarded that may not warrant
his or her exclusion from the jury. Thus, despite the safeguards available in the
selection of a capital jury to protect against bias, it appears possible for some
lingering bias to slip through and affect the juror’s decision. Accordingly, the judge,
who has training and experience to weigh and apply the law impartially,238 should
make the determination on mental retardation.
Notwithstanding the fact that some jurors may correctly weigh the defendant’s
mental retardation, because some jurors will react to stereotypes about mental
retardation and allow these stereotypes to bias their judgment, the judge, and not the
jury, should make the mental retardation determination. The risk that some jurors
may be biased enough by their ignorance of mental retardation is sufficient to
remove the retardation determination to the judge. For all of the foregoing reasons,
Ohio’s requirement that the judge make the mental retardation determination is more
appropriate and results in a more consistent application of Atkins.
VIII. THE DIFFERENCES IN PROCEDURES LEAD TO AN ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF
ATKINS
The death penalty may not be applied under sentencing procedures that “create[]
a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”239
Because of Ohio’s and Georgia’s different procedures for determining mental
retardation, there is a great risk that Atkins protections will be arbitrarily applied.240
The procedural differences in Ohio and Georgia “increase the unpredictability with
which Atkins is applied.”241 For example, as discussed above, a defendant may be
successful in proving his or her mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence, but he or she may be unable to prove his or her retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt.242 Also, a Georgia juror may possess bias toward the alleged
retarded defendant, and that bias may prevent a finding of retardation.243 In other
words, a defendant in Ohio may be found mentally retarded but the same defendant
in Georgia may not. This is the essence of an arbitrary application of Atkins; “the
availability of [Atkins] protections become a function of local law.”244

238
By statute, “[t]he oath of office of each judge of a court of record shall be to support
the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, to administer justice
without respect to persons, and faithfully and impartially to discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent on him as such judge, according to the best of his ability and understanding.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (2005).
239

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).

240

See Orpen, supra note 21, at 88 (arguing that the failure of the Supreme Court to set a
uniform state standard for determining insanity and mental retardation leads to an arbitrary
application of capital sentences, which “arguably violates Furman”).
241

Id. at 91.

242

See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.

243

See supra Part VII.

244

Orpen, supra note 21, at 88.
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A uniform national procedure and definition of mental retardation is necessary to
ensure that Atkins is not applied arbitrarily.245 The Ohio procedure, as has been
shown to best offer Atkins protections, should serve as a national legal procedure for
determining mental retardation for Atkins purposes. Because both the Ohio and
Georgia definitions are substantively similar to the definitions offered by medical
authorities, either could be used as the legal definition of mental retardation. Using
one of these definitions will ensure states determine mental retardation consistently.
IX. RECOMMENDED PROTECTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The mentally retarded are at an acute risk of wrongful sentencing, particularly
because of bias and misunderstanding of their disorder. Because the mentally
retarded often attempt to hide their disability,246 attorneys may be genuinely unaware
of a defendant’s mental retardation and may fail to raise the issue or to request much
needed experts to prove the defendant’s claim.247 Also, the mentally retarded are
susceptible to police coercion during interrogation.248 It is thus necessary that some
training procedures be implemented to protect the rights of the mentally retarded.249
Ohio and Georgia do not offer much training to police, judges, or attorneys. In
Ohio, the “Peace Officer Training Academy” (POTA) offers a variety of training
classes for peace officers, including a class on “Dealing with the Mentally Ill in a
Crisis.”250 This, however, appears to be the extent of Ohio training programs
available to police officers; there is no mandatory training required for police
officers to identify mentally retarded criminal offenders. The Ohio Public
Defender’s Office makes available on its website sample motions for attorneys
representing mentally retarded defendants who may be sentenced to death.251 The
office does not make available any training classes or programs for representing the
mentally retarded.252 Likewise, Georgia, at its Public Defender’s Office website,
offers some assistance to attorneys representing mentally impaired individuals and to
family and friends of the mentally impaired.253
245

Id. at 91.

246

See John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 734 (1988) (stating that because mentally
retarded persons are often able to mask their intellectual limitations, they are “often thought to
be ‘stupid,’ ‘a little slow,’ ‘dumb,’ or ‘uncooperative’ rather than mentally retarded”).
247

Human Rights Watch, supra note 1.

248

Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428.

249

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1 (recommending training programs for police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges).
250
Ohio Attorney Gen., POTA Online Course Catalog, http://www.ag.state.oh.us/
le/training/catalog/CourseCatalog.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). Topics at this class include
an introduction to mental and psychiatric illnesses and mental retardation. Id.
251

See Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Mental Retardation Motions, http://opd.ohio.
gov/Mental/Mental_Claims_mainpage.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2006).
252

See Id.

253

See Debra J. Blum, GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNSEL, WHEN SOMEONE
MENTAL ILLNESS IS ARRESTED IN GEORGIA (2003), http://www.gpdsc.com/omha-
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To protect the rights of mentally retarded defendants, Georgia and Ohio should
offer mandatory training programs to death penalty attorneys and police officers.
The mandatory training for death penalty attorneys would better enable them to
communicate with their mentally retarded clients and assist in their defense.254
Further, this training would enable attorneys to recognize mental retardation early on
and challenge waivers of procedural rights that their client may have never
understood.255 The mandatory training for police officers would better equip them to
identify mental retardation and enable them to utilize this training when questioning
mentally retarded defendants.256 This training will help protect the rights of mentally
retarded individuals and ensure that their retardation is recognized early in the
criminal process such that they are afforded all the protections granted by Atkins.
X. CONCLUSION
Ohio’s procedure for determining mental retardation is superior to Georgia’s and
should serve as the basis for a national mental retardation legal procedure. Ohio and
Georgia offer substantially similar definitions of mental retardation and either could
be used as a national legal definition of mental retardation. Ohio and Georgia have
vastly different procedures for determining mental retardation. Ohio’s procedure
affords the best opportunity for the defendant to receive the protections of Atkins. To
prevent an arbitrary application of Atkins, it is important that Ohio’s procedure, and
Ohio’s or Georgia’s definition, be adopted to serve as national legal standard for use
in determining mental retardation.
Ohio’s use of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove mental
retardation is a more appropriate standard of proof because it better meets the overall
goal of Atkins. There are great differences between requiring a defendant to show he
or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence than requiring a
defendant to show he or she is mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt. A
mentally retarded defendant’s low intellectual functioning suggests that requiring
him or her to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is best
suited to his or her unique needs.257 As shown above, it is clear that requiring
resources-handbook.pdf. Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, Mental Health
Advocate: Seminar Calendar, http://www.gpdsc.com/omha-resources-seminars.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2006) (listing OMHA Mental Health Seminar on May 19, 2005).
254

Bing, supra note 26, at 84-86.

255

Bing, supra note 26, at 82; see also State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (N.C.
1993) (holding that a finding of mental retardation in North Carolina is no bar to a knowing
and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights where the defendant appeared to understand
instructions and signed a waiver form, even though the defendant had an I.Q. score between
61 and 69 and a mental age of 8 to 10 years); Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 754 (Ga.
1994) (finding valid a mentally retarded defendant’s confession because there was no police
coercion).
256
Bing, supra note 26, at 72 (noting that mentally retarded persons have “an increased
susceptibility to the influence of authority figures”); see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note
152, at 428-29 (“Because few mentally retarded people are able to determine what information
might have legal significance for their case, spontaneous memory and cursory questioning
cannot reliably ascertain all the facts.”).
257

See Bing, supra note 26, at 134-35; see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428;
Entzeroth, supra note 120, at 917.
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mentally retarded capital defendants to prove mental retardation by a preponderance
of the evidence will best meet the goal of Atkins by effectively ensuring that
mentally retarded capital defendants do not face the death penalty.
Ohio’s requirement that a judge determine mental retardation is more appropriate
than Georgia’s requirement that a jury make such a determination because of the
greater risk for jury bias. Requiring the judge to make the retardation determination
provides the greatest opportunity to minimize bias. Thus, Ohio’s requirement that
the judge determine mental retardation should be adopted into a national legal
procedure for determining mental retardation.
The definitions of mental retardation proffered by Ohio and Georgia mirror those
offered by medical authorities. Other state definitions of mental retardation are more
complex in their language, and may create confusion in their application.258 Either
Ohio or Georgia’s definition of mental retardation should be adopted to serve as the
national legal standard for Atkins purposes because both reflect the modern medical
world’s understanding of mental retardation. Adopting either of these definitions
will also help ensure that Atkins is applied consistently in all states implementing the
death penalty.
A uniform procedure and definition for Atkins claims is necessary to ensure that
all retarded persons receive the protections of Atkins. Absent a national standard, as
Ohio’s and Georgia’s different procedures show, Atkins protections become a
function of state law and vary depending on the jurisdiction in which one is tried.259
A national standard is, therefore, necessary to ensure that Atkins is not arbitrarily
applied.
SCOTT R. POE*

258
See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1)
(West 2005) (defining mental retardation); Raines, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that the
1983 definition of mental retardation, like that used by Florida, is difficult for laypersons to
understand).
259

Orpen, supra note 21, at 88.
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